Merleau-Ponty, Henry and Laruelle on Dualism. From Phenomenology to Non-Philosophy, and Back
Merleau-Ponty, Henry And Laruelle On Dualism From Phenomenology To Non-Philosophy, And Back

Summary/Abstract: In a relatively recent article1, R. Barbaras remarks that Merleau- Ponty’s treatment of the ontological status of the world is a failed attempt to surpass the dualistic structure characterising transcendental anthropomorphism. Drawing on a distinction from Hans Jonas’s The Phenomenon of Life (1966), Barbaras considers that a position eluding dualism can be established starting from bio-morphism, which constructs the nature of our body not from the perspective of a transcendental consciousness (Husserl), but from the reality of the lived body. Merleau-Ponty’s revision of Husserl’s phenomenology endeavours to operate a reconciliation of transcendental anthropomorphism with a non-dualistic interpretation of flesh. But, in Barbaras’s opinion, “this is a reconciliation that is obviously impossible”2. As a result, Merleau- Ponty does not accomplish a revocation of dualism, but continues to work with the same set of oppositions that Husserl’s phenomenology makes available in the investigation of perception

• Details
• Contents