A Non-egological conception of consciousness in Aron Gurwitsch‘s phenomenology Cover Image

Neegologinės sąmonės samprata Arono Gurwitschiaus fenomenologijoje
A Non-egological conception of consciousness in Aron Gurwitsch‘s phenomenology

Author(s): Mindaugas Kazlauskas
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Vytauto Didžiojo Universitetas
Keywords: phenomenology; non-egological consciousness; pure ego; Gestalt psychology; intentionality.

Summary/Abstract: This article analyses Aron Gurwitsch’s conception of consciousness without the ego. In the concept of non-egological consciousness, the aim of reduction is not to reveal transcendental ego as the undeniable foundation, but rather to reveal the field of consciousness i. e. correlations of experience and notional objects. In Gurwitsch’s phenomenological philosophy ego is defined as a hypothetical component of act of consciousness, which is considered as a relation between noema and noesis. On the one hand, Gurwitsch‘s criticism against the conception of pure ego can be related to the detailed explication of the concept of the field of consciousness. On the other hand, after removing transcendental ego, a question of the subject emerges: what happens with the subject in the concept of nonegological consciousness?

  • Issue Year: 13/2011
  • Issue No: 4
  • Page Range: 36-44
  • Page Count: 9
  • Language: Lithuanian
Toggle Accessibility Mode