Inductive reasoning: from Carnap to cognitive science
Inductive reasoning: from Carnap to cognitive science

Summary/Abstract: The dominating models of inductive processes have been based on symbolic representations of knowledge. This was the explicit assumption of the Vienna school and most of Carnap's work on induction follows this principle. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that most cognitive phenomena in humans and animals are based on non-symbolic representations. As an alternative to symbolic representations of information and knowledge, this paper investigates a theory of "conceptual spaces." Such spaces consist of a number of "quality dimensions" which often are derived from perceptual mechanisms. They can be used to describe cognitive processes like concept formation and induction. A 'geometric' model of concept formation is proposed and its relation to prototype theory is discussed. It is shown that Carnap in his later writings was moving towards this approach to induction. It is also argued that conceptual spaces are suitable for representing the results of information processing in connectionist systems.

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