Zamisao i propast napadne operacije Jugoslavenske narodne armije na Hrvatsku u rujnu 1991. godine
The Conception and Failure of the Offensive Operation of the Yugoslav National Army in September 1991

Summary/Abstract: Literally from the elections of the spring of 1990 onward the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) undertook measures to utilize firepower to take control of the non-Communist government in Croatia. Up to the summer of 1991 it intended to use relatively light force to topple the Croatian leadership. During this period it operated according to modified principles of the use of force in extraordinary situations. From the summer of 1991, due to the rapid growth of the Croatian armed forces, the option of implementing a war plan was looking more likely, which clearly meant a build up of military power. Mobilization of force began in May 1991, and was repeated at the end of June and the middle of September. This game of hot-cold war negatively impacted the mobilization in Serbia. In addition, the subversive activity of the Serbian Renewal Movement has to be considered as well as the lack of motivation among a portion of the military conscripts to fight outside of Serbia. Poor morale was the result of a lack of clear military objective. From the beginning, the failure of mobilization and weak leadership discouraged the military leadership from following the plan to its conclusion. Almost before the operation even got underway, on the 20 September 1991, General Blagoje Adžić admitted that the operation had failed and that a modified plan had to be adopted. The working out of a new plan took ten days; during this time the JNA was supposed to have won the war. During this period Croatian forces had captured forces of the JNA equal to a reinforced army corps and the balance of power was no where near as favourable as before September 20. For ten days the JNA was preparing for a new, reduced plan which clearly did not even closely meet expectation, thus the Serbian leadership opted to bring the war to an end on October 6. It was satisfied with the territory held. Following this, battles continued on a tactical level. The JNA failed to achieve even one operational success. It expended the most effort on Vukovar. Later in 1991 both sides made this city a key objective. For the JNA, that is Kadijević and the like, this is where the Croatian army was forced to accept Vance’s plan, while on the Croatian side the view took hold that Croatia gained the time to acquire armaments and develop new operational forces. From the documents it is clear that neither position is supportable. The offensive operation collapsed before it began, that is, during mobilization of forces, and Vukovar, despite the significance of its defense, did not play the role which was later, without any analysis, ascribed to it.

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