THE BEING OF HISTORY, THE PLAY OF DIFFÉRANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF MISUNDERSTANDING
THE BEING OF HISTORY, THE PLAY OF DIFFÉRANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF MISUNDERSTANDING

Summary/Abstract: Beginning with the second decade of the last century, after a fierce critique of W. Dilthey and the Historical School’s epistemological approach, philosophical hermeneutics has assumed the position of “official” philosophy of history of our times. In the present paper we would like to show that in spite of this position philosophical hermeneutics proves nevertheless incapable to answer one of the two basic questions confronting any philosophy of history whatsoever, namely “How is history to be known?,” making historical science problematic. For if the being of history really is tradition as philosophical hermeneutics argues, and if the essence of tradition is language then, on the one hand, the very stability of historical meaning presupposed by any epistemological process will always be displaced by the play of what Derrida calls “difference”. And, on the other hand, even if historical meaning were stable enough so as to be known, it could not be grasped because, we will try to argue, the process of understanding as philosophical hermeneutics describes it is always permeated by misunderstanding.

• Details
• Contents