Витгенщайн за логиката на 'вътрешното' в бележките по философия на психологията
Wittgenstein on the logic of the 'inner' in his remarks on the philosophy of psychology

Summary/Abstract: Starting with the question of how an expression is given to the so-called inner (human experiences, "Erlebnisse"), two distinct groups of themes that seem to provide an answer are analyzed in the beginning of the paper: the theme of aspect seeing and the theme of the inadequacy of the picture of the inner. First of all, it is argued that the inner is seen primarily as a specifi c aspect. Then an attempt is made at explaining why, nevertheless, the picture of the inner is a dangerous metaphor. Finally, the conception is introduced that what actually gives an expression to the inner is the special logic of the usage of the words about it. This logic makes itself manifest in the consequences to be drawn from utterances about inner states; it is characterized by certain indeterminacy of inferences and the resulting uncertainty of the knowledge about the inner. These characteristics, however, do not imply that the mental is hidden in some sort of inner space, as it has been widely assumed in the tradition, but rather refl ect the peculiarity and complexity of the language games, in which the inner is being described.

• Details
• Contents