THE DEBATE ON THE NOTION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ Cover Image

GINČAS DĖL LEIBNIZO KŪNINĖS SUBSTANCIJOS SAMPRATOS
THE DEBATE ON THE NOTION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ

Author(s): Alvydas Jokūbaitis, Laurynas Adomaitis
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Vilniaus Universiteto Leidykla
Keywords: Leibniz; corporeal substance; idealism; realism.

Summary/Abstract: Leibnizian metaphysics is traditionally held to be idealistic. It means that reality is composed of soul-like substances whereas material bodies are mere phenomena. The traditional interpretation presupposes that Leibniz’s view has not changed during the mature period (from 1683 onward). Some commentators have recently challenged this view. They claim that either Leibniz (despite inconsistency) was both a realist and an idealist (Hartz), or changed his view on the nature of substance (Garber). The aim is to defend the traditional interpretation and to reply to the arguments by realist commentators.

  • Issue Year: 2014
  • Issue No: 86
  • Page Range: 139-152
  • Page Count: 14
  • Language: Lithuanian