За (не)ефективността на философията
On the (In)effectiveness of Philosophy

Summary/Abstract: In one of his essays Eugene Wigner speaks of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. Steven Weinberg, however, tries to show the validity of the expression „the unreasonable ineffectiveness of philosophy“ with respect to the growth of scientific knowledge. Some prominent physicists even talk about the death of philosophy. My aim in this paper is to put forward the following two claims and to show how valid they are: (A) philosophy can (and even must) have productive conceptual relations with science, and (B) philosophy must not have (or does not display having) such relations with science. In support of (A) argumentation is provided, if not exhaustively with respect to its normative contents, at least as a true description of key episodes from the history of scientific theorizing. To this effect, the descriptive pretention of (B) has to be rejected, as well as its prohibitive status, to the extent to which the normative pretention of (A) is defended.

• Details
• Contents