Проблемът за логическото във „Философски изследвания“
The Problem of the Logical in „Philosophical Investigations“

Summary/Abstract: The article argues that in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations the logical problems do not disappear when grammar is substituted for logic. In presenting a way of thinking that contrasts with Tractatus logico-philosophicus Wittgenstein fails to notice that he is actually ignoring the logical problems that are important for the elucidation of his later ideas. By registering a change in the status of logic, which he suggests but does not actually follow, the opportunity is provided not to ignore his early discoveries. For this purpose the article proposes tracing the indicators of problems in Philosophical Investigations , such as: rules of language games, grammatical observation and family resemblances as successors of the semantics of logical forms, logical experience and generality of logic in the Tractatus.

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