Meinong On The Phenomenology Of Assumption
Meinong On The Phenomenology Of Assumption
Author(s): Jacquette DaleSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Societatea Română de Fenomenologie
Summary/Abstract: As a student of Brentano’s, Alexius Meinong pursued his teacher’s thesis of the intentionality of mind in his own distinctive way and in a direction that was unlike Brentano’s. Where Anton Marty in his philosophy of language adhered very closely to Brentano’s reductive reist conception of particulars and particular properties, and Edmund Husserl developed a version of descriptive psychology that culminated in transcendental phenomenology, Meinong proposed a theory of objects or Gegenstandstheorie as an implication of Brentano’s commitment to the division between physical and psychological phenomena on the basis of the intentionality of the psychological and nonintentionality of the physical.
Journal: Studia Phaenomenologica
- Issue Year: III/2003
- Issue No: 1+2
- Page Range: 155-177
- Page Count: 23
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF