Nezávislosť centrálnej banky a postavenie Európskeho systému centrálnych bánk
INDEPENDENCE OF A CENTRAL BANK AND POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS

Summary/Abstract: In the sixties of 20th century, monetary policy was still considered as an integral part of demand oriented economic policy, the objective of which was to achieve full em-ployment and gross national product at the level of potential product by optimal combi-nation of fiscal and monetary policy instruments. In that context, moderate inflation was perceived as a legitimate means to achieve mentioned goals. But supply shocks and fol-low-up inflation advancement in the seventies led to the understanding of the price sta-bility achievement and sustainability as a top-priority task of monetary policy. This change in the economic theory main stream came up at the same time with convincing arguments in favor of an independent central bank. In its monetary policy, bank of circu-lation independent from politicians, electors or media has the best conditions for prefer-ring the long-term objective of price stability to the short-term economic growth and employment increase. On the contrary, politically dependent central bank would be scarcely able to face the possible pressure of the government trying to bring on a favo-rable political economic cycle and therefore intentions declared in the anti-inflation poli-cy wouldn’t be perceived as credible by economic entities. In the effort to ensure the credibility of anti-inflation policy, it is also possible to bind monetary policy by standing rules as an alternative to an autonomous central bank. But this approach did not acquit well either. The arguments against politically independent central bank go out particularly of the statement that it is incompatible with elementary democratic principles when the group of non-elected technocrats disposes of large competence and act without direct control carried out by the parliament. This objection can be disproved – besides the existing pre-cedent in the form of independent courts – by a mention of indirect legitimacy of a cen-tral bank. In a final consequence, it is exactly democratically elected politicians who make the decisions about a degree of the central bank political autonomy, determine mo-netary policy objectives and they also name senior officials of a central bank. Moreover, various empirical studies confirm the expediency of an independent central bank for economic development of the country. The states with an autonomous central bank show besides the lower inflation rate also low unemployment, and the rate or volatility of economic growth is not negatively influenced by the independence of a central bank as well. Following these arguments, the question of what degree is the independence of their own central bank ensured to, thus becomes very important for the citizens of present and future Member States of the European Economic and Monetary Union...

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