Spór relatywizmu z absolutyzmem na temat pojęcia prawdy
Relativism or Absolutism?
Author(s): Renata ZiemińskaSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Keywords: truth relativism; concept relativism; objectivism; Twardowski; Putnam; relatywizm prawdy; relatywizm pojęciowy; obiektywizm
Summary/Abstract: The article presents the debate between truth relativism and truth absolutism. The source of relativism is the lack of certainty (if we have no guarantee that any of our proposition is true, we can think that our concept of objective truth is useless and should be replaced by a concept of subjective and so relative truth). Relativism is the thesis that truth depends on subject, time, place and circumstances of assertion, and so, two opposite propositions can be both true (for instance for two different persons). Truth absolutism is the negation of truth relativism. It is a thesis that one and the same proposition can not be both true and false relative to any circumstances of its assertion (time, subject, place). The main contemporary relativist argument is concept relativism (we must think in a conceptual scheme, so the truth of our beliefs depends in some way on the scheme). But, the concept relativism does not entail truth relativism. Only existence of a proposition depends on a conceptual scheme. The truth of the proposition need not be so dependent, if we accept the existence of the objective world and the concept of objective truth. Objectivism entails absolutism (objective truth is timeless).
Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Issue Year: 57/2009
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 299-314
- Page Count: 16
- Language: Polish