Rola psychologii w ekonomicznej teorii zachowań ludzkich Gary’ego S. Beckera
The role of psychology in Gary S. Becker’s economic approach to human behavior

Summary/Abstract: The paper presents an interpretation of G.S. Becker’s “economic approach to human behavior” with regard to relations of this standpoint in economic methodology with psychology. The aim of the paper is to properly identify the role that psychology plays both in works of Becker himself, and in the “economic approach”. Ties of psychology with the “economic approach” are subject to the analysis in the following aspects: Becker’s declarations, practice of his work, as well as in the context of methodological sources of inspiration of the “economic approach”, with the potential of its enhancement towards a more consistent use of findings of psychology. Beckerian methodology is presented in such a way, so as to highlight its historic and methodological roots and inspirations. It is considered as an uncompromised application of situational explanation, Popperian rationality principle, Robbins’ analytical definition of economic science, as well as Freidman’s view about the irrelevance of “realism” of economic model assumptions. The paper indicates that despite inspiration with Bentham’s psychology, the “economic approach to human behavior” fits into anti-psychologist paradigm in economic methodology. In accordance with methodological standpoints of Popper, Robbins and Friedman, Becker replaces “realistic” descriptions of human psyche with axiomatic, “unrealistic” assumptions of maximization and rationality. However, psychological knowledge is very relevant for Becker’s theory because it constitutes an important condition for accurate construction of individual utility functions. Therefore, by the utilization of a question from moral psychology, the paper presents the possibility of the ”economic approach” more deeply rooted in Bentham’s ideas, with potential benefits for explaining human behavior. As indicated by D.C. North, neoclassical economics poses a problem: Why do people comply with social institutions and keep promises under conditions, in which maximizing individual utility would suggest otherwise? A solution to this problem might be assuming the existence of a Beckerian commodity, that could be named moral self-satisfaction. This reasoning may run into criticism related generally to the elaborated methodological concept, with particular role of the “adhocery” accusation of Mark Balug. However, the concept of pleasures and pains bound with moral beliefs is rooted in our psychological, and even biological, knowledge about man, his needs and mind. The approach this paper proposes may be helpful in accomplishing a number of goals. First, the ancient forerunner of the “economic approach” Jeremy Bentham tried to create a comprehensive list of kinds of pleasures and pains. Such a list is increasingly more likely to be created in contemporary times, due to developments in psychology, unknown to Bentham. Secondly, developments in psychology may offer both inspiration and empirical support for particular commodities assumed in Beckerian utility functions,

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