Phenomenology without “the body”?
Phenomenology without “the body”?
Author(s): Chris NagelSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Societatea Română de Fenomenologie
Keywords: Embodiment; Meaning; Mind-body problem; Origin; Subjection
Summary/Abstract: French phenomenology focused on “the body” to avoid the supposed transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology, and to provide an “existential” or “empirical” account of the origin of meaning, as Ricoeur put it. In practice, however, this has implicitly presupposed a Cartesian problematic of the relation between body and mind or “subject.” This is the source of the ultimate frustration of this effort, as well as the persistence of a “mystery” of meaning (to cite Merleau-Ponty and Henry). Th is essay offers an alternative, considering the embodiment of any meaningful experience, suggesting finally that embodiment must be accounted for in terms of subjection.
Journal: Studia Phaenomenologica
- Issue Year: XII/2012
- Issue No: 12
- Page Range: 17-33
- Page Count: 17
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF