Definability and Paradox (some considerations)
Definability and Paradox (some considerations)

Summary/Abstract: This paper exposes some aspects of the way in which the selfreference and negation do generate the limitation results, both in the usual language (in the form of some paradoxical constructions) and in the formal languages (in the form of limitation theorems). These results can be analysed from the point of view of definability, by using two formal languages, one without negation and in which the semantic notions are definable, and a language with negation, in which the presence of semantic notions leads to paradox and therefore to in-definability results. A comparison with self-referential structures containing syntactic concepts reveals the asymmetry semantic-syntactic. Finally, as a case study, the analysis of Heidegger’s apory of tematization will reveal us that no mystery is involved in the idea of indefinability of Being; on the contrary, this apory, simply, has the structure of Russell’s schema.

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