Kontrastywizm epistemiczny
Epistemic Contrastivism
Author(s): Rafał PalczewskiSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Uniwersytet Warszawski - Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: contrastivism; contextualism; knowledge ascriptions; the analysis of knowledge
Summary/Abstract: According to contrastivism in epistemology — advocated chiefly by Jonathan Schaffer — the knowledge relation is not binary (s knows that p) but ternary (s knows that p rather than q). Thus knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. The aim of this paper is to portray, investigate and assess the details of this view. In the first three sections I focus mainly on arguments for contrastivism. Section fourth is devoted to the contrastivist solution to the skeptical puzzle. In the last three sections I present several problems for contrastivism as well as three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity.
Journal: Filozofia Nauki
- Issue Year: 17/2009
- Issue No: 4 (68)
- Page Range: 105-130
- Page Count: 26
- Language: Polish