Some Epistemological Consequences of The Dual–Aspect Theory of Visual Perception
Some Epistemological Consequences of The Dual–Aspect Theory of Visual Perception

Summary/Abstract: Seeking whether our perception produces knowledge which is not only relative or subjective perspective on things, is to be engaged in the realist/anti–realist debate regarding perception. In this article I pursue the naturalistic approach according to which the question whether perception delivers objective knowledge about the external world is inseparable from empirical investigation into mechanisms of perception. More precisely, I have focused on the dual aspect theory of perception, one of the most influential recent theories of perception which unifies two traditionally opposite approaches to perception: ecological and constructivist. I have tried to show that the dualistic model of human vision does not support the majority of realist theses aimed at non–relativism, but supports only pragmatic realism about observational reports (dorsal system) and the moderate realism about observational reports (ventral system).

• Details
• Contents