A kormányzás angol mintája
The English Pattern of Governance

Summary/Abstract: At the beginning of the 20th century both countries, Hungary and the United Kingdom experienced serious constitutional crises. According to Vernon Bogdanor the constitutional crises in the UK in 1909–1911 (power of veto of the House of Lords), in 1914 (Irish Home Rule Act) and in 1931 (appointment of Ramsay MacDonald as prime minister) shed light on the fact that the British monarch would still have been able to exercise his royal prerogatives in spite of the gradual emergence of basic constitutional conventions of parliamentary government. The events in 1931 demonstrated that the monarch was still able to appoint a prime minister who did not enjoy the confi dence of the House of Commons. The effective exercise of the royal prerogative to appoint a prime minister provoked an even more serious crisis in Hungary in 1905–1906. The appointment of his bodyguard (Géza Fejérváry) to prime minister, despite his explicit rejection by the parliamentary majority, revealed that the Austrian Emperor took his royal prerogatives very seriously in an exceptional situation. Since the competence of the monarch to appoint a prime minister – even in absence of the confi dence of the parliamentary majority behind him – was one of the most discussed topics in both countries. I will try to compare the prevalence and exercise of this royal prerogative in both countries. After describing and evaluating the events of the constitutional crises at the beginning of the 20th century in both countries I also hope to draw a more sophisticated picture on the mechanism of instrumentalization of the image of the British par liamentary system in Hungary.

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