Válság táplálta delegálás (A technokratikus autonómia változása Nyugat-Európában pénzügyi válság idején)
Crisis-driven Delegation (Changing Technocratic Autonomy at the Time of the Financial Crisis in Western Europe)

Summary/Abstract: The theory of crisis-driven delegation posits a causal link between policy uncertainty– usually associated with crisis situations–and the strategic decisions of elected office-holders. As a result the autonomy of unelected technocrats—and that of the bureaucracies supervised by them—is expanded, if only for a brief period of time. This article examines the relevance of the theoretical framework in the context of the financial crisis of 2008-2010 in 7 Western European countries. The results provide justification for the testable hypotheses with respect to institutional change operationalized as adjustments to extant rules and or ganisations. Evidence shows that in crisis situations politicians prefer autonomous technocrats and institutions over carefully elaborated rules. Ex post control and oversight, as opposed to ex ante directives, are the choice of politicians for holding technocrats accountable. And consensus, rather than conflict, drives the political process in these periods of extreme policy uncertainty. While the results of the article are preliminary at best, they present the theory of crisis-driven delegation as a promising research agenda and a useful supplement to extant research on the cyclical changes of the scope of the state.

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