Ontologizm, czyli Siemiona Franka polemika z pokantowskim epistemologizmem
Ontologism – S. Frank’s Polemic with Post-Kantinian Epistemologism
Author(s): Teresa ObolevitchSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Keywords: S. Frank; I; Kant; neo-Kantism; epistemology; metaphysics; neokantyzm; epistemologia; metafizyka
Summary/Abstract: In this article I compare philosophical investigations of S. Frank and epistemology of Kant and neo-Kantians of Marburg school. In accordance with Kant’s conclusions, neo-Kantians claimed that an object of cognition is unknown (x) which is not “given” but “made” by a subject during the process of cognition. Whereas Frank, beginning with an analysis of judgment concluded that an object of cognition (unknown x) is Absolute or all-unity which really exists. Frank insisted that Absolute enables every cognition. Contrary to neo-Kantians, Frank stressed the primacy of being over cognition. These characteristics in Russian philosophy and was named by the term “ontologism.”
Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Issue Year: 55/2007
- Issue No: 2
- Page Range: 67-79
- Page Count: 13
- Language: Polish