SEARLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MULTIPLE DRAFTS MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS Cover Image

SEARLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MULTIPLE DRAFTS MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS
SEARLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MULTIPLE DRAFTS MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Author(s): Đorđe Vidanović
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Универзитет у Нишу
Keywords: Searle; Dennett; Multiple Drafts Model; consciousness; memes; genes; intentionality

Summary/Abstract: In this paper I try to show the limitations of John Searle's critique of Daniel Dennett's conception of consciousness based on the idea that the computational architecture of consciousness is patterned on the simple replicating units of information called memes. Searle claims that memes cannot substitute virtual genes as expounded by Dennett, saying that the spread of ideas and information is not driven by "blind forces" but has to be intentional. In this paper I try to refute his argumentation by a detailed account that tries to prove that intentionality need not be invoked in accounts of memes (and consciousness).

  • Issue Year: 07/2009
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 173-182
  • Page Count: 10
  • Language: English
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