Czy empiryczne świadectwa na rzecz „ucieleśnienia” poznania są anomaliami w świetle klasycznych koncepcji procesów poznawczych?
Are Empirical Proofs of Embodied Cognition Anomalies in the Context of Classical Models of Cognition?

Summary/Abstract: The article disuccusses the role played by anomalies in Kuhn’s sense in the transition from the „classical model of cognition” to the „embodied paradigm” which can recently be observed in the field of the cognitive sciences. An example of the aforementioned problem is analysed in detail: the role of empirical evidence in the dispute about the nature of conceptual representation. It is shown that evidence in favour of the „embodied” theories of concepts are not entirely conclusive and are not at all inconsistent with more „classical” theories. This example shows that empirical anomalies seem to play a lesser role than one might think in at least some of the quasi-paradigmatic and paradigmatic changes in cognitive science.

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