DETACHMENT, INVOLVEMENT, AND RATIONALITY: ARE WE ESSENTIALLY RATIONAL ANIMALS? Cover Image

DETACHMENT, INVOLVEMENT, AND RATIONALITY: ARE WE ESSENTIALLY RATIONAL ANIMALS?
DETACHMENT, INVOLVEMENT, AND RATIONALITY: ARE WE ESSENTIALLY RATIONAL ANIMALS?

Author(s): Hubert Dreyfus
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Slovenská Akadémia Vied - Kabinet výskumu sociálnej a biologickej komunikácie
Keywords: Rationality; reasons for actions; situation; detachment; involvement; coping

Summary/Abstract: Philosophers have long thought that what differentiates humans from mere animals is that humans are essentially rational. The rational nature of human beings lies in their ability to detach themselves from ongoing involvement and to ask for as well as give reasons for activity. According to the philosophical tradition, human action and perception generally should be understood in light of this ability. This essay examines a contemporary version of this conviction, one promulgated by John McDowell. McDowell follows the tradition in suggesting that people are always able to step back and to ask as well as answer why questions about what they are doing, i.e., they always have reasons for their actions. This essay shows that people have no reasons for many of the things they do. They often, instead, simply respond to shifting situational fields of attraction and repulsion. These attractions and repulsions cannot be captured in propositional form—any attempt to describe, or even just name, them turns them into objects and robs them of their motivational force. The demands of the situation are not available as reasons, but exist only as embodied in actions. McDowell, consequently, errs in claiming that conceptual capacities are inextricably implicated in human activity. Nor is the detached, rational way of being any more essential to human life than is involved coping.

  • Issue Year: 2007
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 101-109
  • Page Count: 9
  • Language: English
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