System wynagradzania menedżerów jako kluczowy czynnik determinujący politykę zarządzania ryzykiem banku. Studium przypadku Lehman Brothers Holding
Executive compensation system as a key factor determining bank risk management policy: The Lehman Brothers case study

Summary/Abstract: The article presents an analysis of the importance of the executive compensation system’s structure for the bank risk management policy. The case of Lehman Brothers proves that the construction of remuneration schemes for the bank executives should require the specific problems arising from the Agency Theory. The level of payment must be associated with long-term objectives and the strategy of sustainable growth. To achieve that it is necessary to formulate new guidelines and rules dedicated to the banking sector. It turns out that current forms of managers’ participation in the ownership do not provide sufficient protection against the so-called moral hazard. Recent studies show that managers are in fact rewarded for winning highly levered bets on the value of banks’ assets. While in the case of losing they make only a kind of ‘paper losses’.

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