Przeciw naturalizacji filozofii działania
Against the Naturalization of the Philosophy of Action

Summary/Abstract: The paper offers certain arguments against the naturalization of philosophy of action. It is assumed that naturalization of philosophy of action implies its reduction to an empirical action theory, e.g. psychological theory of action recognition. It is shown that even if there is no difference between extensions of the philosophical concept of action and its scientific counterpart, there is a difference in their intensions. This argumentation is illustrated by juxtaposing the philosophical debate regarding the character of relation between intentions (reasons) and actions with the psychological debate on mechanisms responsible for action recognition in infancy. This raises a question whether the outcome of the psychological debate can settle the philosophical dispute. I show that although there are some prima facie similarities between these debates, there are also deep conceptual differences between philosophy of action and cognitive psychology that justify a negative answer to this question.

• Details
• Contents