TYPE AS EXPERIENTIAL STRUCTURE FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
TYPE AS EXPERIENTIAL STRUCTURE FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
Author(s): Jagna BrudzińskaSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk
Keywords: expectation; experience; intentional; genetic phenomenology; motivation; type.
Summary/Abstract: The article focuses on Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy as an intentionalgenetic theory of experience. I inquire into the elementary forms and principle of the organisation of subjective experiences and investigate the concepts of type in the context of pre-predicative constitution. I attempt to show how far type, conceived as a concrete and acquired coherence of homogenous experiences, determines the process of interest-awakening even before higher predicative procedures—such as discursive and reflexive thinking—take place. Following such a path, phenomenology comes closer to the philosophy of life, to the Gestalt theory, and to the psychoanalytic theory of understanding.
Journal: Dialogue and Universalism
- Issue Year: 2015
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 101-114
- Page Count: 14
- Content File-PDF