Yet Another Look at the Conceivability and Possibility of Zombies
Yet Another Look at the Conceivability and Possibility of Zombies

Summary/Abstract: Since 1996, when David Chalmers introduced the zombie argument against physicalism in The Conscious Mind, numerous works of ever-increasing technical complexity and nuanced argumentation have been written on the conceivability and possibility of zombies. In this paper, I focus on the main points of the argument. First, I discuss the conceivability of zombies. I briefly outline three other thought-experiments in order to determine what is expected of a good thought-experiment and its workings. Next, I turn to Chalmers' defense of their conceivability, where the key consideration is to present conceivability as a credible a priori method that can entail metaphysical possibility. I conclude that Chalmers does not manage to create a credible link between conceivability and possibility, thus failing to show that zombies are not only conceptually possible, but also metaphysically possible. The most problematic idea is the identification of logically possible worlds with metaphysically possible worlds. Chalmers' main aim is to defend conceivability as an a priori method of acquiring modal knowledge, but by limiting it to the rational domain, the acquired knowledge is not knowledge of the objective reality, but of the content of our thoughts.

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