Economic Mobilization in Germany prior to and during World War II
Economic Mobilization in Germany prior to and during World War II

Summary/Abstract: The task of this research paper is to present evidence of the economic mobilization observed in Germany under the Nazi rule, prior to and during World War II. In addition to the presentation of the German efforts at the mobilization of the economy towards waging a war, I would like to comment on the validity of the ‘Blitzkrieg economy,’ theory as I adduce the evidence, which contradicts such a theory by revealing comprehensive and costly industrial and military expansion programs undertaken by Germany both prior to the war and during its course the Labor and capital investment in the German war effort are discussed in detail in order to identify the structural problems that existed in the German economy. From the presented evidence, it can be concluded that the Third Reich’s leadership could not agree on the policies which were indispensable to utilizing the nation’s economic capacity in such a way as to maximize the effectiveness of modern industrial military conflict. The assertion that the lack of uniform and effective economic policy was the only reason for Germany’s ultimate defeat would be oversimplification, as the question of scarcity of resources (natural resources, manpower, machinery and factory space) had also an important impact on the outcome of hostilities. However it can be argued that problems with shortages observed as the war started to wear the industrial base of Germany can be – at least to a certain extent − attributed to the mistakes of the economic policy, many of which had its roots in intense personal and political rivalry between individual decision makers and governmental agencies, industrialist in the context of poorly delineated prerogatives and responsibilities.

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