АНАЛИТИЧНИ ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛНИ АРГУМЕНТИ
Analytical Transcendental Arguments

Summary/Abstract: One of the major characteristics of the so-called ‘analytic Kant scholarship’ is its attempt to use ‘Kantian transcendental argumentation’, broadly construed, while rigorously detaching it from the context of the accompanying transcendental psychology and transcendental idealism in general. On this interpretation ‘Kantian’ transcendental arguments harbour primarily anti-skeptical potential: they can (and should) be taken as an attempt at a definitive refutation of Cartesian skepticism. Allegedly, Kant aims at an ‘internal refutation’ of skepticism, i.e., a refutation using a premise shared by the skeptic, or, in a stronger version, comprising an inalienable part of his/her position. Generally, this key premise is identified with the reality of conscious subjective experience of some kind. Then, the analysis of the possibility of such experience is expected to show that amongst the latter’s conditions of possibility is the existence of external objects (the standard interpretation of the Second edition ‘Refutation of Idealism’), which entails the falsity of the skepticism with regard to external objects.

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