DETERRENCE OF A CRIMINAL TEAM:
HOW TO RELY ON ITS MEMBERS' SHORT COMINGS?
DETERRENCE OF A CRIMINAL TEAM: HOW TO RELY ON ITS MEMBERS' SHORT COMINGS?
Author(s): Enric LanglaisSubject(s): Economy
Published by: Reprograph
Keywords: criminal teams; corporate criminality; state dependent risk aversion; deterrence; monetary penalties versus detection
Summary/Abstract: In this paper, we assume that a criminal organization is an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability.
Journal: Journal of Applied Economic Sciences (JAES)
- Issue Year: IV/2009
- Issue No: 07
- Page Range: 97-114
- Page Count: 18
- Language: English