Does Experimental Ethics Have a Normative Account?
Does Experimental Ethics Have a Normative Account?

Summary/Abstract: The first obstacle experimental ethics faces when it comes to its normative account is Hume’s guillotine, also known as the naturalistic fallacy. My objective is to show how experimental ethics can answer to naturalistic fallacy with the help of normative projections. In order to arrive at my objective, I will first explain what experimental philosophy (xphi) is, and how it is perceived as a movement against “armchair philosophy.” In the second section, I explain why experimental moral philosophy or experimental ethics is immune to many of the arguments that are raised against xphi, and why it is not necessary to be against armchair philosophers. After this, I argue that discussing the meta-ethical grounding of experimental ethics will not help us to answer to the naturalistic fallacy. The last section contains my own proposal for seeing people’s intuitions and decisions as normative projections that have an impact on normative ethics. In this way, Hume’s guillotine is no longer an obstacle for a normative account of experimental ethics.

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