Међународни положај Југославије у време првих спољнополитичких акција Џонсонове администрације
The International Situation of Yugoslavia at the Times of the First Foreign Policy Actions of the Johnson Administration

Summary/Abstract: John Kennedy’s exit from the world stage after the assassination in Dallas and setting-up of the new American administration headed by president Johnson put in doubt the longevity of principles on which the platform of Yugoslav-American relations was based, which got its | nal shape only after protracted mutual endeavors after Tito’s visit to Washington in October 1963. The unwillingness of Yugoslav of| cials to tackle more aggressively the problem of further improvement of cooperation with USA led to the conservation of relations between Belgrade and Washington which were without conflicts, but cool. Such state of affairs was much more damaging Yugoslav than American interests. It weakened Yugoslavia’s international position and rendered consolidation of its inner economic situation more dif| cult. Regardless of unhidden ideological animosities, Tito and his collaborators had to give priority to pragmatic orders of the day of Yugoslavia’s economic development. Many initiatives of Belgrade for improvement of relations with USA were inspired by this consideration. They met with favourable response in Washington, since in late 1964 a number of events took place which reawakened the interest of the United States in closer cooperation and contacts with the Yugoslav leadership. Namely, within a week in October the Conference of Heads of State of the Block- Free Countries ended in Cairo, the | rst Chinese A-bomb was exploded and the leader of the Soviet Communists Nikita Khrushchev was suddenly deposed. All three events could be in some connection with the danger of the increase of Chinese influence on the world stage. The Chinese doctrine of inevitable clash of countries with different systems was propagated at the Cairo summit by some influential statesmen from developing countries. The unsaddling of Khrushchev was construed in the West as an attempt of the Soviet leadership to normalize relations with Beijing of| cials, and the fact that the Chinese A-bomb was tested only one day after that removal, seemed as a much too curious a coincidence. Since Tito had imposed himself as one of the main opponents of pro-Chinese attitudes at the non-aligned summit, but also since it was exactly him who was able, after the plain crash at mount Avala in which legendary Soviet generals Zhdanov and Biryuzov had been killed, to be among the | rst statesmen to learn about the background of stormy events in Moscow – the interest of the Johnson administration in urgent and frequent contacts with the Yugoslav leadership was rekindled. This U-turn contributed to temporary improvement of the Yugoslav-American relations and to the increased cooperativeness of USA in matters of economic and | nancial support for the stabilization of the Yugoslav economic system.

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