Gadamerova hermeneutika kao praktička filozofija
Gadamer's Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy

Summary/Abstract: The article shows the net of the most relevant nations of philosophical hermeneutics and presents their inner substantial interconnectedness with Aristotle's concept of practical philosophy. The starting point used to approach philosophical hermeneutics is Husserl's concept of Lebenswelt, his analysis of the crisis of European sciences, and the traditional explanation of several nations of practical philosophy, which altogether enables one to introduce some important Gadamer's concepts, such as prejudice and hermeneutical circle. The elaboration of other fundamental nations of tradition, situation, effective-historical consciousness, fusion of horizons, application and experience is the next step of the following Gadamer's thought. The explanation of the mentioned nations intends to legitimize Gadamer's central thesis that our understanding is never mere subjective oriented behaviour. On the contrary, it is always historically limited. In this context, the notion of prejudice loses its negative connotation and represents not only the link with our tradition, but also the original source of all our judgements. Taking into consideration this notion as highly relevant, Gadamer intends to explain the process of understanding. He tends to show that we can never fully escape from all of our prejudices, although it does not mean that we cannot encounter them critically. Within our very historical being and union with our tradition, is the ground for their understanding. We cannot erase our own horizon when approaching someone else, rather we should find a common ground with them. Therefore, the process of understanding has always a dialogical character, and it is never a mere subjective act. Gadamer's profound critique of aestethic and historical consciousness, which both tried to make a break with tradition, serves to further development of his thesis. Gadamer's determination of process of our understanding as historical is opposed to the universal pretension of the method of natural sciences. Experiences of art, philosophy and social sciences (die Geisteswissenschaften) counterstroke it. One cannot recognize the sense of social sciences once they are excluded from the horizon of pra:xis. Moreover, social sciences are moral sciences and the notion of progress, usual in terminology of natural sciences, cannot be applied to them. Their very purpose is human self-understanding. Final part of the article deals with some possible consequences, resulting from the standpoint of philosophical hermeneutics, and several objections directed at this position. Namely, the question of possibility of rehabilitation of the practical phenomenon, as opposed to the methodological truth of natural sciences, is being problematised. Furthermore, there is an outline of some other crucial problems given, such as revival of self-understanding of social sciences, universal competence of scientific experts and domain and objectives of contemporary education. Concerning the critics, the article considers objections for relativism, traditionalism and utopism.

• Details
• Contents