Разновидности на прагматистката концепция за истината
Varieties of Pragmatist Truth
Author(s): Hristo GyoshevSubject(s): Anthropology, Philosophy, Social Sciences, Education, History of Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Contemporary Philosophy, Pragmatism
Published by: Фондация за хуманитарни и социални изследвания - София
Keywords: Charles S. Peirce; Ferdinand Schiller; William James and John Dewey; Bertrand Russell; pragmatist conception of truth; correspondence; consensus theory; instrumentalism; warranted assertibility; human
Summary/Abstract: In this paper, I focus on the first formulations of the pragmatist conception of truth advanced by Charles S. Peirce, Ferdinand Schiller, William James and John Dewey. I attempt to delineate and compare the particular place of these four conceptions in the common framework of pragmatism, and to estimate their potential to replace the traditional understanding of truth as a ‘correspondence’ with an alternative concept based on the pragmatist understanding of truth. As the results show, the pragmatist philosophers do not really replace 'correspondence' with another concept, and while they often disapprove of it, they tacitly depend on its meaning for their conceptions of truth, which leads to an inconsistent position regarding the concept of correspondence. I also pay attention to the consequences of the pragmatist conceptions about truth for scientific knowledge.
Journal: Критика и хуманизъм
- Issue Year: 2015
- Issue No: 44/1
- Page Range: 175-198
- Page Count: 24
- Language: Bulgarian
- Content File-PDF