Разновидности на прагматистката концепция за истината
Varieties of Pragmatist Truth

Summary/Abstract: In this paper, I focus on the first formulations of the pragmatist conception of truth advanced by Charles S. Peirce, Ferdinand Schiller, William James and John Dewey. I attempt to delineate and compare the particular place of these four conceptions in the common framework of pragmatism, and to estimate their potential to replace the traditional understanding of truth as a ‘correspondence’ with an alternative concept based on the pragmatist understanding of truth. As the results show, the pragmatist philosophers do not really replace 'correspondence' with another concept, and while they often disapprove of it, they tacitly depend on its meaning for their conceptions of truth, which leads to an inconsistent position regarding the concept of correspondence. I also pay attention to the consequences of the pragmatist conceptions about truth for scientific knowledge.

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