Strategie wyborcze w świetle wybranych teoretycznych modeli głosowania
Election strategies in the light of chosen voting models

Summary/Abstract: Nowadays, the politicians’ behavior is a matter of interest not only for political scientists but also economists. Conducted analyses are mostly based on formal models. Although the created models are imperfect, they have an important element of a positive analysis. The purpose of this article is to present selected voting models and their conclusions for election strategies. This article discusses three models: median voter model, probabilistic voting model and a model of partisan politics. The first model is widely known concept and is treated as an introduction to the characteristics of the next two models. Two further models are now frequently used concepts in political economics, which tries to explain the behavior of politicians and its influence on the society and economy. If it is possible to determine the preferences of the median voter, the politicians will behave opportunistically and adapt programs (economic policy) to the voters. There is a complete convergence of election programs. In opposite situations (preferences of the median voter cannot be determined) divergence of election programs may appear.

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