TTIP’s Monetary Clause Muddle
TTIP’s Monetary Clause Muddle

Summary/Abstract: We argue that TTIP negotiations, which are focused on improving conditions for mutual trade and investments between the U.S. and the EU, have overlooked the issue of the influence of monetary and exchange rate policies of both sides on the potential results of a prospective agreement. Thus we demonstrate that the agreement should have been supplemented by a monetary clause (MC) in order to avoid a possible mismatch between U.S. and EU currencies. Such a clause, and no other possible currency related legal instruments, should be broad, and aim to regulate the bond between the dollar and the euro. It can work as a convenient springboard to invigorate the multilateral trade system via the institutional nexus of the IMF, WTO, OECD or G-20. The clause can make the agreement as important for strategic relations between the U.S. and the EU as the Treaty of Rome was for the rise of European integration.

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