Naturalizált kísértetek?
Naturalized Ghosts?

Summary/Abstract: The paper addresses Ryle’s famous critique of Cartesian theories of mind, according to which the mind is a “ghost in a machine”, and mental processes are to be understood as “para-mechanical”, and investigates whether and to what extent this characterization may also be accurate for later accounts of mental phenomena in analytical philosophy. It presents a large-scale overview of the development of analytical philosophy of mind from the mid-20th century until today, including diverse versions of materalism (reductive and non-reductive), functionalism and the cognitivist paradigm, the so-called separationist view of the mind and its criticism based on representationalism about phenomenal content, phenomenal intentionality and cognitive phenomenology, and also the latest alternatives to classical cognitivism, i.e. the socalled 4e approaches (embodied, extended, enacted and embedded theories of mind). The paper considers in some detail whether these accounts may be charged with (still) presenting the mind as being a ghostin the material world, and argues thatin different ways and to a different extent this characterization is still applicable, by showing that the first personal aspects of the mind and mental phenomena cannot be easily explained or explained away, neither by the classical naturalist theories, nor by their new alternatives. Hence, the conclusion is that the ghost is still with us, even if naturalized.

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