Immanuela Kanta koncepcja osoby jako nomen dignitatis
A human being as nomen dignitatis – the concept of Immanuel Kant

Summary/Abstract: The text reconstructs the concept of a human being presented in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant in two stages: firstly in the Critique of Pure Reason in the excerpts devoted to paralogisms of Pure Reason, secondly in the first part of Metaphysics of Morals or in The Metaphysical Elements of Law. The author points out that it is right to recognise a person in practical philosophy of Immanuel Kant as a nomen dignitatis, however there are significant limitations connected to this concept. The personality of a human being is perceived through the prism of the universality of the moral law. Speaking about the dignity of a human being, we refer only to a certain aspect of her/his humanity and therefore a person is not the whole human being, nor is it a particular person. Consequently, it is difficult for the dignity of the human being to correspond to the obligation to the respect towards an individual because of her/his individuality, which is based on contemporary human rights.

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