Objektívnosť morálnych hodnôt : Problém Maxa Schelera
The Objectivity of Moral Values : The Problem of Max Scheler
Author(s): Jozef UramSubject(s): Philosophy, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Phenomenology
Published by: Teologická fakulta Trnavskej univerzity
Keywords: Max Scheler;phenomenology;values;objetivity
Summary/Abstract: The article analyses the meaning of values in the view of Max Scheler. Values are given a priori, and are “feelable” phenomena. The intentional feeling of love discloses values insofar as love opens a person evermore to beings-of-value (Wertsein). Although he proclaims the objectivity of values, some elements of his theory make the objectivity of values problematic. The first element is the access to values exclusively through the affective intuition and the second element is the understanding of moral value as a choice of superior value in the hierarchy of values. This perspective doesn’t correspondent to the truth of human being, makes the moral value relative and opens the doors for emotivism in the ethics.
Journal: Studia Aloisiana
- Issue Year: 6/2015
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 47-59
- Page Count: 13
- Language: Slovak