ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HIRING FORMS DEDICATED TO MANAGERIAL POSITIONS IN POLAND Cover Image

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HIRING FORMS DEDICATED TO MANAGERIAL POSITIONS IN POLAND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HIRING FORMS DEDICATED TO MANAGERIAL POSITIONS IN POLAND

Author(s): Jacek Lewkowicz
Subject(s): Economy, Micro-Economics
Published by: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika
Keywords: agency theory; information asymmetry; conflict of interest; supervision; employment contract; law and economics

Summary/Abstract: This paper deals with the economic analysis of hiring forms dedicated to managerial positions. Theoretical frames for corporate governance are based on agency theory. Crucial problems considered within agency theory are: information asymmetry, conflict of interests and supervision (monitoring) of management. Presented analysis covers also remuneration forms and manager’s participation in ownership. Theoretical underpinnings of this research supports the analysis of managers hiring methods available in Poland (managerial contracts and employment contracts) in order to point out the solution, which reduces agency costs to the greatest extent.

  • Issue Year: 14/2015
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 221-232
  • Page Count: 12
  • Language: English