O argumencie Corazzy przeciw pojęciu
myśli zależnej od przedmiotu
Corazza’s Critique of the Concept
of Object-Dependent Thought
Author(s): Aleksander LatkowskiSubject(s): Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Published by: Uniwersytet Warszawski - Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: object-dependent thought; perceptual knowledge; psychological generalization; structured proposition; direct reference
Summary/Abstract: The aim of the article is to prove that the concept of an object-dependent thought withstands the critique put forward by Eros Corazza. In the first section of the article I present and elaborate on the concept of object-dependent thought, formulated for the first time by Gareth Evans. In the second section I present Corazza’s criticism of this concept and point to the fact — not emphasized enough by Corazza — that it may be understood in two different ways: methodological and ontological. In the final part of the article I defend the concept of object-dependent thoughts. I show that ontological intuitions are not a sufficient ground for the refutation of the concept, since this would mean that they need to be strengthened with methodological assumptions. Those assumptions however — in the light of my argumentation — do not seem justified.
Journal: Filozofia Nauki
- Issue Year: 24/2016
- Issue No: 3 (95)
- Page Range: 43-72
- Page Count: 30
- Language: Polish