Why the regime change in North Korea will not come from society – an evolutionary game theory explanation
Why the regime change in North Korea will not come from society – an evolutionary game theory explanation

Summary/Abstract: The purpose of the article is to explain the mechanisms behind the stability of the North Korean regime with regard to social dynamics. The continuing survival of the regime decades after the fall of its former patron and sponsor, the Soviet Union, poses an interesting question regarding the mechanism preventing change. The author uses an evolutionary game theory model to show constraints in the evolution of institutions initiated by a change of behaviour in a population. As a result, she singles out three basic constraints of social change: the proportion of the population bearing a new trait or predisposed to change and the difference in payoff between the new and old model of behaviour. The author shows that the North Korean regime monitors those three factors very carefully in order to prevent the formation of a critical mass of opponents within the system which could eventually lead to the subversion of the regime.

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