Aktywność otwartych funduszy emerytalnych w nadzorze korporacyjnym
Open-end Pension Funds Engagement in Corporate Governance

Summary/Abstract: The aim of this article was to portray how open-end pension funds (OFEs) perform oversight functions in their portfolio companies, to analyze the determinants pertaining to this activity and to assess the quality of their oversight. This analysis covers the activity exhibited by pension funds at the shareholder meetings of portfolio companies from 2009 to 2012 and following statutory amendments in 2014 and 2015. This analysis of the legal determinants and of the incentives to be engaged in oversight indicates that investment limits should not form an obstacle to pension funds’ activity; however, one should anticipate more extensive engagement in companies that exert the greatest impact on the pension funds’ relative performance. The findings demonstrate that in both periods under analysis the largest pension funds have discharged their fiduciary duties. Despite significant modification to the legal environment affecting the investment activity and economic position of pension fund companies, pension funds have been found to be more active in the period following the changes to the law. The level of activity and the extent of intervention in the various portfolio companies varied in these two periods. This article depicts the author’s proprietary concept for an activist closed end investment fund as a shared platform for OFEs to take activist measures and share the costs incurred in this process.

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