Superficially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths
Superficially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths
Author(s): Marco RuffinoSubject(s): Epistemology, Logic, Contemporary Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Published by: KruZak
Keywords: Contingent a priori truths; rigid designation; contingency; descriptive names; Gareth Evans;
Summary/Abstract: In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ (1979) distinction between superficially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction.
Journal: Croatian Journal of Philosophy
- Issue Year: XVI/2016
- Issue No: 47
- Page Range: 247-266
- Page Count: 20
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF
