Heurystyczna rola obrazów świata w przyjmowaniu faktów filozoficznych
The heuristic role of world-pictures in the process by which philosophical facts come to be accepted

Summary/Abstract: This article aims to show that our acceptance or nonacceptance of certain facts is influenced by our adoption of a philosophical world-picture as a kind of background knowledge on the basis of which one decides what does or does not exist, and what is true or false. For this purpose, I discuss the positions of the existential omists. To begin with, it is demonstrated that philosophical facts are accepted on the basis of a world-picture that is itself a tangle of facts, values, and theories exhibiting varying degrees of generality. Whether we embrace them or not is thus not determined by any sort of direct experience. ere are no neutral philosophical facts. Our world-picture suggests what sort of facts we are prepared to accept, and what methods we use to explain them. It is on precisely this that the heuristic role played by world-pictures in “creating” philosophical facts depends.

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