Arguments for the simple view of personal identity Cover Image

Argumenty na rzecz nieredukcyjnego ujęcia tożsamości osobowej
Arguments for the simple view of personal identity

Author(s): Mariusz Grygianiec
Subject(s): Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Existentialism, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Hermeneutics
Published by: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Keywords: criteria of identity; personal identity; simple view; person; truth condition; persistence; genidentity

Summary/Abstract: In the debate on personal identity many different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. Criteria of identity are usually taken to state necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are viewed, in their metaphysical interpretation, as providing truth conditions of relevant identity statements. In my paper I argue that this view is misconceived and I present some arguments for the simple view of personal identity, according to which there are no noncircular and informative criteria of identity for persons. In particular, I argue that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which would serve as truth conditions of statements concerning numerical identity. I also try to justify the view that in most cases criteria of identity should be interpreted either epistemically as a means for finding out whether identity holds or not or metaphysically as criteria of genidentity, which provide appropriate persistence conditions for objects of a given kind.

  • Issue Year: 2016
  • Issue No: 34
  • Page Range: 5-28
  • Page Count: 24
  • Language: Polish