Аргументът „мозъци в стъкленици“
The “Brains in a Vat” Argument

Summary/Abstract: This article discusses the significance of Hilary Putnam’s “brains in a vat” argument for the metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language in the last 30 – 35 years; the presentation is limited only to the classical discussion of the argument, almost entirely leaving aside the contemporary debate. Putnam devised this argument in order to refute both metaphysical realism and skepticism in philosophy. The analysis of the argument against metaphysical realism demonstrates that this realism is based on the causal restriction of linguistic reference. After the reconstruction of Putnam’s argument, the article attempts to show by further analyzing it the extent of its consequences for a philosopher’s epistemological stance, and especially for theories of truth.

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