Evolutionary Stability of Discriminating Social Norms
Evolutionary Stability of Discriminating Social Norms

Summary/Abstract: The paper presents an evolutionary model illustrating the dynamicsthat give rise to discriminatory social norms i.e. such rules of behaviour thatfulfil two conditions: (1) they treat differently actors having the same abilitiesand technical options, but differing in some arbitrary sense (2) they are supportedby socially enforced sanctions. In the presented model both discrimination andsocial norms are necessary to solve a coordination problem that arises when thesituation requires different actors to perform different tasks. The properties ofbehavioural rules relying on discrimination and leading to various degrees ofinequality are analysed. It is demonstrated that in general norms ensuring equalpayoffs are easier to stabilize, but unfair norms can also be stable.

• Details
• Contents