O niemożliwości całkowitej odpowiedzialności moralnej (przeł. Jacek Jarocki)
The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility (trans. Jacek Jarocki)
Author(s): Galen StrawsonContributor(s): Jacek Jarocki (Translator)
Subject(s): Philosophy, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Published by: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Keywords: free will; moral responsibility; causa sui; determinism; indeterminism; Galen Strawson
Summary/Abstract: The problem of moral responsibility occupies a central place in the discussions concerning free will. It is generally held that it has far-reaching consequences for social life and law. However, as Galen Strawson argues, it is impossible to be morally responsible for one's own actions. The argument runs as follows: a person decides one way or another on the basis of his character, personality traits or other mental respects. However, one cannot be responsible for those features—it seems obvious that they are caused by factors one cannot be responsible for, such as one's upbringing or genes. Hence the only way to be morally responsible is to be causa sui, i.e. the cause of oneself. It is widely acknowledged though that nothing can be causa sui. It follows that moral responsibility is impossible.
Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Issue Year: 65/2017
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 109-129
- Page Count: 21
- Language: Polish