Linguistic Explanation and ‘Psychological Reality’
Linguistic Explanation and ‘Psychological Reality’

Summary/Abstract: Chomsky’s generative approach to linguistics has been debated for decades without consensus. Questions include the status of linguistics as psychology, the psychological reality of grammars, the character of tacit knowledge and the role of intuitions. I focus attention on Michael Devitt’s critique of Chomskyan linguistics along the lines of earlier critiques by Quine, Searle and others. Devitt ascribes an intentional conception of grammatical knowledge that Chomsky repudiates and fails to appreciate the status of Chomsky’s computational formalisms found elsewhere in cognitive science. I argue that Devitt’s alternative to the psychological view—a “linguistic reality” of physical objects as the proper subject matter of linguistics—neglects the problems of tokens as opposed to types and misses the force of Chomsky’s arguments against Behaviourism. Furthermore, I suggest that Devitt’s case against intuitions misunderstands their standard, central role throughout perceptual psychology. Of more general interest, I argue that Devitt’s position exemplifies compelling errors concerning mental representation seen throughout cognitive science and philosophy of mind since the 17th Century.

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